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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
NO. 97-5568 
 
DONALD BURNS, 
 
       Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WILLIS E. MORTON, SUPERINTENDENT; 
PETER VERNIERO, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE 
STATE OF NEW JERSEY 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 97-cv-02507) 
 
Submitted by the Clerk pursuant to I.O.P. Ch. 10.6 
October 9, 1997 
 
Before: BECKER, NYGAARD, and ROTH, Circuit Judges. 
(MOTIONS PANEL A) 
 
(Filed January 9, 1998) 
 
       DONALD BURNS #210090 
       Trenton State Prison, CN 861 
       Trenton, NJ 08625 
 
        Pro se 
 
 
  
       JENNIFER L. GOTTSCHALK 
       Office of Attorney General of 
        New Jersey 
       Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex 
       Trenton, NJ 08625 
 
        Counsel for Appellees 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
The district court dismissed Donald Burns' petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus as untimely under 28 U.S.C. 
S 2244(d)(1), and granted a certificate of appealability to 
appeal from this dismissal. We conclude that Burns' 
petition was timely filed under the principles set forth in 
Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988). We will summarily 
reverse the dismissal, and remand the cause to the district 
court. 
 
I. 
 
Burns pleaded guilty in New Jersey Superior Court, Law 
Division, to multiple counts of robbery, aggravated assault, 
unlawful possession of a weapon, and conspiracy. On 
September 10, 1987, Burns was sentenced to 100 years in 
prison with fifty years of parole ineligibility. The Appellate 
Division modified his sentence to forty years with a twenty- 
year period of parole ineligibility. The New Jersey Supreme 
Court denied Burns' petition for certification. 
 
Burns then filed a petition for post-conviction relief in 
state court, which denied relief. After extensive post- 
conviction proceedings, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
denied his petition for certification on September 21, 1995. 
 
On April 22, 1997, Burns submitted his petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. S 2254, to officials at 
the New Jersey State Prison to be mailed to the Federal 
District Court for the District of New Jersey.1 The Clerk of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Burns provided a copy of a receipt from prison officials verifying that 
he submitted his habeas petition for mailing on April 22. 
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the district court received Burns' petition on April 28, 1997. 
The district court granted Burns' application to proceed in 
forma pauperis on May 5, 1997, and the Clerk docketed 
Burns' habeas petition as filed on that date. 
 
In considering whether Burns' petition was timely filed, 
the district court first recognized that under Duarte v. 
Hershberger, 947 F. Supp. 146 (D.N.J. 1996), the petition 
could not be dismissed as untimely under the one-year 
period of limitation of 28 U.S.C. S 2244(d)(1) if the petition 
was filed on or before April 23, 1997. The court also noted 
Burns' assertion that he had submitted his petition to 
prison officials on April 22, 1997. Nonetheless, the court 
concluded that Houston v. Lack, under which a pro se 
prisoner's notice of appeal is considered filed at the time he 
submits it to prison officials for mailing, does not apply to 
habeas petitions. The court thus found that Burns' petition 
was filed after April 23, 1997, and dismissed it as untimely 
under S 2244(d)(1). The court also granted Burns a 
certificate of appealability to appeal from this dismissal. 
Burns filed a timely notice of appeal.2  
 
II. 
 
28 U.S.C. S 2244(d) provides in relevant part: 
 
       (1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an 
       application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person 
       in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State 
       court. The limitation period shall run from . . . 
 
         (A) the date on which the judgment became final 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The appellees assert that we lack jurisdiction to hear this appeal 
because Burns' notice of appeal was untimely filed. The district court 
entered its order dismissing Burns' petition on July 18, 1997; the 
district court received Burns' notice of appeal on September 2, 1997, 
well beyond the thirty-day period for filing a notice of appeal. See Fed. 
R. App. P. 4(a)(1). However, Burns is incarcerated and benefits from Fed. 
R. App. P. 4(c), under which an inmate's "notice of appeal is timely filed 
if it is deposited in the institution's internal mail system on or before 
the 
last day for filing." Because Burns delivered his notice of appeal to 
prison officials for mailing on August 4, 1997, his notice of appeal was 
timely filed, and we have jurisdiction to hear his appeal. 
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       by the conclusion of direct review or the 
       expiration of the time for seeking such review; 
       . . . 
 
       (2) The time during which a properly filed application 
       for State post-conviction or other collateral review 
       with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is 
       pending shall not be counted toward any period of 
       limitation under this subsection. 
 
28 U.S.C. S 2244(d). 
 
Section 2244(d) became effective on April 24, 1996, when 
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
was signed into law. Applying S 2244(d) as of its effective 
date would require Burns to have filed his habeas petition 
before September 21, 1996, one year after his petition for 
certification was denied by the New Jersey Supreme Court, 
but less than five months after S 2244(d) became effective. 
Several other courts of appeals have held that applying 
S 2244(d) in this manner "would impermissibly `attach new 
legal consequences to events completed before its 
enactment.' " Calderon v. United States Dist. Court for the 
Cent. Dist. of Cal., ___ F.3d ___, 1997 WL 671283, at *4 (9th 
Cir. Oct. 29, 1997), quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 
U.S. 244, 270 (1994); see Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856 
(7th Cir. 1996), rev'd on other grounds, 117 S. Ct. 2059 
(1997); see also United States v. Simmonds, 111 F.3d 737 
(10th Cir. 1997) (holding that 28 U.S.C. S 2255's one-year 
limitation cannot bar motions filed prior to April 24, 1997). 
These courts have fashioned a rule that "[n]o petition filed 
on or before April 23, 1997 -- one year from the date of 
AEDPA's enactment -- may be dismissed for failure to 
comply with [S 2244(d)(1)'s] time limit." Calderon, 1997 WL 
671283, at *4. The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit has articulated a somewhat more flexible 
rule that a habeas petitioner must be afforded a 
"reasonable time" after April 24, 1996, tofile his petition. 
Peterson v. Demskie, 107 F.3d 92, 93 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding 
petition filed 72 days after effective date timely under 
S 2244(d), even though petitioner's conviction became final 
in 1978). 
 
We agree that applying S 2244(d)(1) to bar the filing of a 
habeas petition before April 24, 1997, where the prisoner's 
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conviction became final before April 24, 1996, would be 
impermissibly retroactive. Even under S 2244(d)(1)'s time 
limitation, would-be petitioners are afforded one full year to 
prepare and file their habeas petitions, and as of April 24, 
1996, have been placed on notice of this time constraint. 
We reject the notion that petitioners whose state court 
proceedings concluded before April 24, 1996, should be 
afforded less than one year with notice. Accordingly, we 
hold that habeas petitions filed on or before April 23, 1997, 
may not be dismissed for failure to comply with 
S 2244(d)(1)'s time limit. 
 
Additionally, we note that federal inmates who wish to file 
motions to vacate, set aside, or correct their sentences 
under 28 U.S.C. S 2255 must adhere to a one-year period 
of limitation virtually identical to that of S 2244(d)(1). See 
28 U.S.C. S 2255. We recognize that the one-year period of 
limitation under S 2255 is not squarely presented in this 
case. However, for the orderly administration of justice and 
to provide immediate guidance to the district courts, we 
think it imperative that we resolve this issue now. Cf. 
Santana v. United States, 98 F.3d 752, 756 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(holding in a S 2255 case that procedural rule also applies 
to S 2254 petitions). Federal prisoners challenging their 
sentences, no less than state prisoners seeking habeas 
relief, are entitled to one full year with notice to file such 
motions. Thus, S 2255 motions filed on or before April 23, 
1997, may not be dismissed for failure to comply with 
S 2255's one-year period of limitation. 
 
III. 
 
Burns, however, presented his petition to prison officials 
for mailing on April 22, 1997, just one day before the 
deadline. The Clerk of the district court received the 
petition on April 28, and docketed the petition asfiled on 
May 5. The district court concluded that Burns' petition 
was filed after April 23, 1997, and dismissed it as untimely 
under S 2244(d)(1). The district court believed it would err 
by applying Houston v. Lack to the filing of Burns' habeas 
petition. We hold that it would not. 
 
In Houston v. Lack, the United States Supreme Court 
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held that pro se prisoners' notices of appeal arefiled at the 
moment of delivery to prison authorities for mailing to the 
district court.3 The Houston Court discussed the unique 
situation of pro se prisoners who cannot ensure that the 
court clerk will receive their notices of appeal within thirty 
days. The Court explained that a prisoner "has no choice 
but to entrust the forwarding of his notice of appeal to 
prison authorities whom he cannot control or supervise and 
who may have every incentive to delay." Id. at 278. 
 
We are persuaded that the same concerns expressed by 
the Court in Houston pertain to filing a pro se prisoner's 
habeas petition. We recognize that no court of appeals has 
held that Houston applies to the filing of a S 2254 petition 
for the purpose of satisfying S 2244(d)(1). Until the 
enactment of S 2244(d), however, prisoners were not 
required to meet strict filing deadlines and couldfile a 
habeas petition at any time.4 Applying Houston to the filing 
of habeas petitions was simply unnecessary. 
 
Since the enactment of S 2244(d), at least one court has 
applied Houston to a motion under S 2244(b)(3) for 
authorization to file a second or successive S 2255 motion. 
In re Sims, 111 F.3d 45 (6th Cir. 1997). In so doing, the 
court stated that "for purposes of the one-year limitation 
periods established by S 2244(d)," a S 2244(b)(3) motion is 
deemed filed on the date that the motion is given to prison 
authorities for mailing. Id. at 47. Additionally, the Peterson 
court generalized that under Houston, the timeliness of 
prisoners' filings is measured from the date such papers 
are handed to prison authorities for mailing, and implied 
that a S 2254 petition would be considered filed when the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In 1993, the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure were amended to 
reflect the holding of Houston. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(c) advisory 
committee's note. 
 
4. The passage of time was not completely irrelevant prior to the 
enactment of S 2244(d). Under Rule 9 of the Rules Governing Section 
2254 Cases and the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings, a 
"delayed" petition or motion could be dismissed if the state or the 
government had been prejudiced in its ability to respond due to the 
delay. This, however, is a far cry from the one-year time limit prescribed 
in S 2244(d). 
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petition is handed to prison authorities for mailing. See 
Peterson, 107 F.3d at 93. 
 
We have applied Houston to various filings of pro se 
prisoners outside the context of habeas corpus. In an 
action under 42 U.S.C. S 1983, we extended Houston to 
apply to the filing of a motion for reconsideration under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Smith v. Evans, 853 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 
1988). Other courts have applied Houston tofind prisoners' 
S 1983 complaints timely. E.g., Dory v. Ryan, 999 F.2d 679, 
682 (2d Cir. 1993), modified on reh'g, 25 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 
1994); Garvey v. Vaughn, 993 F.2d 776, 782 (11th Cir. 
1993); Lewis v. Richmond City Police Dept., 947 F.2d 733, 
736 (4th Cir. 1991). Houston has also been applied to 
service of discovery responses, see Faile v. Upjohn Co., 988 
F.2d 985, 988 (9th Cir. 1993), and to a motion for an 
extension of time to correct filing deficiencies regarding in 
forma pauperis status, see McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 
F.3d 601, 605 (6th Cir. 1997). 
 
Many have expressed their concern with the pro se 
prisoner's lack of control over the filing of documents, 
especially as compared to the control other litigants 
maintain, e.g., Faile, 988 F.2d at 988. We share their 
concern. Indeed, as we explained above, the Supreme 
Court's holding in Houston was founded on such concerns, 
and are present with equal force where a pro se prisoner 
places his habeas petition in the hands of prison 
authorities for mailing. Once he has done so, he is 
completely unable to ensure that the district court will 
receive his petition promptly; he remains entirely at the 
mercy of prison officials. 
 
IV. 
 
For these reasons, we hold that a pro se prisoner's 
habeas petition is deemed filed at the moment he delivers 
it to prison officials for mailing to the district court. And 
because we see no reason why federal prisoners should not 
benefit from such a rule, and for the purposes of clarity 
and uniformity, we extend this holding to the filing of 
motions under S 2255.5 Finally, because we conclude that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. See supra note 3. 
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Houston v. Lack applies and that Burns' petition was timely 
filed under S 2244(d)(1), we summarily reverse and remand 
for the district court to consider the petition. The petition 
for appointment of counsel is denied as moot. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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